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reciprocity requirement and approach issues of comity based on efficiency and fairness.6 A court 
may also withhold comity when a foreign judgment “clearly undermine[s] the public interest, the 
public confidence in the administration of law, or security for individual rights of personal 
liberty or of private property . . .”7 Congress intended courts to exercise restraint and limit the 
applicability of this public policy exception to situations involving fundamental notions of 
fairness.8  
This article addresses comity’s role in bankruptcy proceedings, with a focus on the 
different requirements as well as the circumstances under which a court would not extend comity 
to a foreign proceeding. Part I discusses the historical application of comity and how courts have 
moved away from the reciprocity requirement. Part II discusses the public policy exception 
through various court decisions indicating that Congress intended comity to be used sparingly. 
This article concludes by determining that a broad application of the public policy exception 
erodes comity's objective to provide for cooperation and deference to foreign proceedings. 
I.  Applying International Comity: Reciprocity or Cooperation? 
When Congress enacted Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code – the statutory provisions 
regulating cross-border proceedings – it did so with the overarching goal of facilitating mutual 
cooperation and coordination between nations.9 Chapter 15 includes the word “comity” and 
instructs judges to promote comity but provides no guidance on how to do so.10 Thus, judges are 
left to ascertain the appropriate role of comity in cross-border proceedings. In making that 
determination, courts consider the interests of the United States, the foreign state and the 
                                                
6 See In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 426. 
7 Corporación Mexicana De Mantenimiento Integral, S. De R.L. de C.V. v. Pemex–Exploración Y Producción, 832 
F.3d 92, 106 (2d Cir. 2016). 
8 See id. (quoting Ackermann v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 841 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that “[t]he public policy exception 
does not swallow the rule: ‘[t]he standard is high, and infrequently met . . .’”). 
9 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 105 (2005). 
10 See In re Artimm, SRL, 335 B.R. 149, 161 (Bankr. C.D.CA 2005) (discussing the broad discretion and flexibility 
afforded to a bankruptcy court); 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2005). 
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efficiency of the law.11 Precedent establishes that “comity should be withheld only when its 
acceptance would be contrary or prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it 
effect.”12  
Although questions of comity arise most frequently in Chapter 15 cases involving 
recognition of foreign insolvency proceedings that does not mean comity is limited to such 
proceedings.13 For example, In re Neves involved a Chapter 7 proceeding in which the 
bankruptcy court granted comity to an Italian court order.14 There, relying on principles of 
comity, the court found it proper to honor the judgment of the foreign court.15 Additionally, 
where Australian bankruptcy law did not offer a creditor the same recourse as would be available 
in the U.S., the court had little trouble concluding that the structure of the Australian law was 
inconsistent with U.S. policy.16   
A.  Granting Comity in the Absence of Reciprocity 
The leading case asserts that “[c]omity, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute 
obligation . . . nor a mere courtesy and good will.”17 Rather “it is the recognition which one 
nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of another nation, 
having due regard to both international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own 
citizens, or of other persons who are under the protection of its law.”18  
                                                
11 See In re Artiumm, SRL, 335 B.R. at 161. 
12 Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, 44 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1994). 
13 See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 110 (discussing the application of § 1520 (a)(2)). 
14 See In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 422. 
15 See id. 
16 See Interpool v. M/V Venture Star, 102 B.R. 373 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1988) (moving to dismiss competing bankruptcy 
proceedings filed under Chapter 7 against the debtor by U.S. creditors); see also In re RHTC Liquidating Co., 424 
B.R. 714, 726 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 2010) (denying a motion to dismiss a Chapter 7 case because “the purpose of 
comity, or cooperation underlying Chapter 15, is not likely to be advanced by a dismissal of the [] case”). 
17 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 163–64; see In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 426 (describing Hilton as “the seminal decision on 
comity”). 
18 Id. 
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 Following Hilton, courts have raised many criticisms over the Supreme Court’s 
definition of comity, mainly that it is both incomplete and ambiguous.19 Is there a duty of 
comity, or is it just a convenience? If so, when is it appropriate to extend comity out of goodwill 
rather than as an obligation? The Hilton court understood comity to be a principle of reciprocity. 
Thus, it determined because French courts would not grant comity to judgments rendered by 
U.S. courts against French citizens, the French “judgment is not entitled to be considered 
conclusive.”20  
The reciprocity requirement has been used to reject comity when a foreign court would 
not defer equally to a U.S. proceeding.21 Courts that have denounced a reciprocity requirement 
have reasoned that such a prerequisite is contrary to our legal system’s policy favoring the end of 
litigation.22  
Notwithstanding the holding in Hilton, courts do not consider reciprocity to be a deciding 
factor, and most refuse to abide by the Hilton decision.23 While reciprocity may be something a 
court considers, it should not be the deciding factor. To hold otherwise undermines its purpose to 




                                                
19 See Somportex Ltd. v. Phila. Chewing Gum Corp., 318 F. Supp. at 168 (discussing commentators’ criticism of 
Hilton’s reciprocity requirement). 
20 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 228. 
21 See In re Toga Mfg., Ltd., 28 BR 165, 169–170 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (denying ancillary relief because the 
creditors would not be treated equally under U.S. and Canadian bankruptcy law). 
22 See Somportex Ltd., 318 F. Supp. at 168; see also In re Colorado Corp., 531 F.2d 463, 469 (10th Cir. 1976) 
(stating that “[d]enying comity to the Netherlands Antilles order because of lack of reciprocity in Canada is such a 
misdirected use of the reciprocity consideration as to constitute an abuse of discretion”). 
23 See Somportex Ltd., 318 F. Supp. at 161, 168 (discussing how New York and California courts have expressly 
rejected a reciprocity requirement, and if they were confronted directly with the issue they would reject it as well). 
24 Cunard S.S. Co. v. Salen Reefer Servs. AB, 773 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1985) quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 
324–25 (1978). 
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B.  Principles of Cooperation and Efficiency take Priority over Reciprocity 
 
 There have been many different tests and approaches used by courts when undertaking a 
comity analysis; in part because there is no set requirement for determining whether comity is 
appropriate. Congress intended that courts have “maximum flexibility” in fashioning appropriate 
orders.25 Thus, while courts’ approaches vary, they all encompass fundamental components of 
jurisdictional and procedural fairness.26  In In re Neves, the court undertook a four-part test to 
determine whether it was appropriate to extend comity to a foreign proceeding.27  
To determine whether extending comity to judgment of foreign court is 
appropriate, a court must evaluate: (1) whether the foreign court was competent 
and used proceedings consistent with civilized jurisprudence, (2) whether the 
judgment was rendered by fraud, (3) whether the foreign judgment was 
prejudicial because it violated American public policy notions of what is decent 
and just, and (4) whether to respect the judgment of a foreign tribunal or to defer 
to parallel foreign proceedings.  
 
28  First, the party arguing for comity has the initial burden to show that the court was competent 
and the proceedings were consistent with civilized jurisprudence.29 The party is required to 
describe the process, why it was not unfair, and why it does not offend the United States’ notions 
of justice.30 Second, the court must find no evidence of fraud in the foreign proceeding.  In In re 
Neves, a Chapter 7 debtor sought recognition of an Italian court order. There, the court held that 
recognition of the order was proper and contained no indication of fraud.31 Further, even in 
                                                
25 See In re Goerg, 844 F.2d 1562, 1567–68 (11th Cir. 1988) quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 325. 
26  See In re Kmart Corp., 285 B.R. 679 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2002) (applying a six-part test); In re Elcoteq, Inc., 521 
B.R. 189 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2014) (applying a five-part test). 
27 See In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 426 (providing an example of how to incorporate principles of cooperation and 
fairness in a comity analysis). 
28 Id. 
29 See id. 
30 See id. at 432 (determining the Italian court’s competence and consistency with civilized jurisprudence) 
31 See id. at 431. 
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instances of fraud such an allegation regardless of whether it is true, is not enough to estop a 
court from granting comity.32 
Once the competence of the foreign court is established, the burden shifts to the opposing 
party to show that the foreign proceeding violates notions of what is decent and just.33 The Neves 
court rejected the objection that recognition of an ex parte order violated due process.34 In In re 
Neves, the appointed judicial administrator was personally served and had the opportunity to be 
heard.35 Even if that had not been the case, however, then the complete denial of due process and 
notice would have been held to be “manifestly contrary to public policy.”36 Further, principles of 
fairness do not require the foreign court to provide the same solution as a U.S. court.37  
 Lastly, deference to foreign proceedings is one of the pillars of comity.38 If the process is 
sound and everything else is fair, the U.S. court should defer to the foreign proceeding and elect 
not to conduct a parallel proceeding.39 When nothing indicates the prejudice of a foreign 
proceeding, and there has been an opportunity for a full and fair trial in front of a competent 
court, “the merits of the case should not, in an action brought in United States upon the 
judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the party that 
                                                
32  See Fleeger v. Clarkson Co. Ltd., 86 F.R.D. 388, 393 (N.D. Tex. 1980) (granting comity to a settlement 
effectuated by a Canadian receiver, where the settlement was approved by the Canadian court: “If, as Plaintiff 
alleges, Defendants have worked a fraud upon the Supreme Court of Ontario, that court is the appropriate forum to 
decide that allegation.”). 
33 See In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 427; see also Bank Melli Iran v. Pahlavi, 58 F.3d 1406, 1409 (9th Cir. 1995). 
34  In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 429, 432 (concluding that ex parte orders are not per se violations of fairness and 
process); see also In re Cozumel Caribe, S.A. de C.V., 482 B.R. 96, 116 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (“[d]ue process is 
not violated by the entry of ex parte orders, provided that notice and opportunity to appear and defend are promptly 
given”). 
35 570 B.R. at 432. 
36 In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. 310, 324 (E.D. Okla. 2012) (holding that the failure to give a U.S. creditor notice of 
Italian insolvency proceeds amounted to a denial of due process and notice under U.S. law). 
37 See In re Metcalfe & Mansfield Alternative Invs. 421 B.R. 685, 697–98 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (stating that “[t]he relief 
granted in the foreign proceeding and the relief available in a U.S. proceeding need not be identical.”). 
38 See In re Axona International Credit & Commerce, 88 B.R. 597, 608 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1988). 
39 In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 428 (stating that “it is not the role of a U.S. Court to review the factual findings of a 
foreign court”). 
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the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.”40 The cases advocating for deference to the 
foreign proceeding do not hinge on the reciprocity requirement in Hilton. Instead, the concern is 
with the fairness and competence of the foreign judiciary, not whether an American judgment 
would be treated similarly by the foreign court.41  
II.  The Limitations of Comity through the Public Policy Exception  
When Congress adopted the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency into Chapter 15 of 
the Bankruptcy Code, it included § 1506 which states: "[n]othing in this chapter prevents the 
court from refusing to take an action governed by this chapter if the action would be manifestly 
contrary to the public policy of the United States."42 The public policy exception allows a court 
to refuse to grant comity to a foreign proceeding when it would directly contravene U.S. laws 
and public policy.43  
A.   The Ambiguous “Manifestly Contrary” to Public Policy Standard: Determining when the  
       Public Policy Exception Applies 
 
 Congress did not define public policy; however, they did express their intent to limit the 
exception to “the most fundamental [] policies of the United States.”44  Thus, it has been left to 
the courts to determine what exactly public policy entails.45 Although Congress left the courts 
with broad discretion, few decisions address when a U.S. policy is so “fundamental” that the 
exception applies.46 This is in part because Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code was not enacted 
until 2005; thus, the scope of the public policy exception has not been clearly defined.47 Courts 
                                                
40 Hilton, 159 U.S. at 203. 
41 See Tahan v. Hodgson, 662 F.2d 862, 867–868. (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
42 11 U.S.C. §1506 (commonly known as the public policy exception). 
43 See In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); In re Neves, 570 B.R at 426; In re Sino-Forest 
Corporation, 501 B.R. 655, 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
44  H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, pt. 1, at 109. 
45 See In re Qimonda AG Bankr. Litig., 433 B.R.  547, 565 (E.D. Va. 2010).  
46 Id. at 568.  
47 See In re Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., 473 BR 117, 123 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2012). 
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that have addressed the public policy exception maintain that Congress included the word 
“manifestly” as a qualifier to “public policy” in the statute to significantly limit the exception.48   
(1) Circumstances not Manifestly Contrary to Public Policy.  
The cases confronted with the public policy exception primarily have held that extending 
comity to a foreign proceeding would not be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy.49 Where 
U.S. creditors received less in a foreign proceeding than they could have obtained from a U.S. 
court that also was not considered manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy.50 The court, 
reasoning that because the right to a jury trial in the bankruptcy context is relatively rare and 
many non-jury foreign proceedings are still “fair and impartial,” held that nothing “prevents a 
United States court from giving recognition and enforcement of a foreign insolvency procedure 
for liquidating claims simply because the procedure alone does not include a right to a jury . . .”51  
Therefore, an examination of the cases that have considered the public policy exception 
reveal that it should be invoked in the rarest of circumstances.52  
(2) Invoking the Exception: Policies Manifestly Contrary to Public Policy 
 Due to the understanding that the public policy exception should be applied narrowly, it 
has been successfully invoked on only a few occasions.53 When determining whether to invoke 
the public policy exception courts have will consider three factors: (i) the procedural fairness of 
the foreign proceeding; (ii) whether the application of the foreign law “would impinge severely a 
                                                
48 In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. at 567. 
49 See generally In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. at 568 (“[T]he fact that application of foreign law leads to a different 
result than application of U.S. law is, without more, insufficient . . . .”). 
50 See In re Ernst & Young, 383 B.R. 773, 781 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2008) (holding that the foreign proceeding would 
not produce “a result so drastically different”). Even the inability to have a jury trial in a Canadian proceeding did 
not warrant the application of the public policy exception. See In re Ephedra Prod. Liab. Litig., 349 B.R. 333, 335 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
51 Id. at 335–337. 
52 See In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. at 565 (discussing the limited circumstances and discretion of the court, upon 
evaluating all facts and circumstances to determine if a specific proceeding amounts to a fundamental violation of 
U.S. public policy). 
53 See In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. at 568 (providing an overview of the decisions discussing the exception). 
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U.S. constitutional or statutory right”; and (iii) if extending comity would “severely hinder [U.S.] 
bankruptcy courts’ ability to carry out . . . the most fundamental policies and purposes” of these 
rights.54  
The public policy exception applied when recognition of a foreign order would have 
violated privacy rights and U.S. criminal laws.55 In In re Toft the court denied enforcement of a 
German court order because the German procedures were “manifestly contrary” to U.S. policy.56 
There, a German Mail Interception Order allowed the foreign representative to gain access to all 
of the Debtor’s current and future e-mails without providing any notice.57 Although such orders 
are common under German law, they are banned under U.S. law.58  
Courts have also invoked the exception where a foreign proceeding deprived a creditor of 
fundamental rights of notice and opportunity to be heard, and when comity would be in 
opposition to U.S. standards of justice.59 The Sivec SRL court determined that a creditor’s 
interests were not protected in an Italian liquidation proceeding. The creditor neither received 
notice nor was given the opportunity to file a claim to initiate a resolution.60 Therefore, the court 
denied the relief sought because the absence of notice and opportunity to be heard are 
fundamental violations of U.S. public policy.61 In In re Gold & Honey, the public policy 
exception applied because the relief sought would otherwise contravene basic notions of 
                                                
54 Id. at 568–69; see also In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. 357, 372 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 2009). 
55 See generally In re Toft, 453 B.R. at 186. 
56 Id. at 196. 
57 See id. at 189. 
58 See id. at 198 (stating that “[t]he relief sought would directly compromise privacy rights subject to a 
comprehensive scheme of statutory protection, available to all aliens, built on constitutional safeguards incorporated 
in the Fourth Amendment . . . .”). 
59 See In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. at 322; In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 371. 
60 In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. at 322. 
61  See id.; see also In re Neves, 570 B.R. at 432 (finding no violation of U.S. policy where there was notice and 
opportunity to be heard). 
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justice.62 There, the court reasoned that recognition would “reward and legitimize” the foreign 
representative’s “violation of both the automatic stay and this Court’s Orders regarding the 
stay.”63 The court further stated that to hold otherwise “would severely hinder [U.S.] bankruptcy 
courts’ abilities to carry out two of the most fundamental policies and purposes of the automatic 
stay. . . .”64 Other cases that have refused recognition on public policy grounds have involved the 
discharge of third-party guarantees and the protection of U.S. patent licenses.65  
The cases that found it appropriate to apply the public policy exception were extremely 
precise in their analysis and reiterated the narrowness of the circumstances in which it applied.66   
B.  Courts Have Increasingly Endorsed a Restrictive Approach to the Public Policy 
Exception 
 
 The cases that have invoked the public policy exception support a standard indicating that 
the doctrine should only be used in the narrowest of circumstances.67 Additionally, courts’ that 
have declined to apply the exception stress the limited circumstances in which it applies.68 A 
narrow understanding of the exception is in harmony with comity’s goals of international 
cooperation and efficiency.69 Thus, in the absence of either irreconcilable procedural unfairness, 
                                                
62 See In re Gold & Honey, Ltd., 410 B.R. at 371. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. at 372. 
65 See In re Vitro S.A.B de CV, 473 B.R. at 132 (determining that a foreign reorganization plan that extinguishes the 
protection of third-party claims is manifestly contrary to the public policy of the U.S.); In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 
165, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011) (holding that deferring to German law, “would severely impinge an important 
statutory protection . . . and thereby undermine a fundamental U.S. public policy promoting technological 
innovation”). 
66 See In re Toft, 453 B.R. at 201 (acknowledging that “this is one of the rare cases in which an order of recognition 
. . . would be manifestly contrary to U.S. public policy”). 
67 See generally, In re Toft, 453 B.R. at 198; In re Sivec SRL, 476 B.R. at 322; In re Gold & Honey, 410 B.R. at 
372–73; In re Vitro, 473 B.R. at 132; In re Qimonda, 462 B.R. at 185. 
68 See In re Ernst & Young, Inc., 383 B.R. at 781 (requiring that the exception is applied narrowly, and “should be 
invoked only when the most fundamental policies of the United States are at risk”). 
69 See Model Law, United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency with Guide to Enactment, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3, Art. 6 ¶ 88 (1999), enacted by G.A. 
Res.52/158, U.N. Doc. A/Res/52/158 (declaring that “international cooperation would be unduly hampered if public 
policy would be understood in an extensive manner”). 
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a constitutional or statutory violation, or the inability of courts to carry out justice, comity would 
likely be granted.70  
Conclusion  
Congress intended comity to be a flexible and discretionary process. Whether comity 
should be extended should be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than through the rigid 
application of a uniform test. The underlying principles of cooperation do not require the same 
approach in every case. The public policy exception should be applied only in the narrowest of 
circumstances. To hold otherwise, would erode the predictability and efficiency that comity 
provides.  
 
                                                
70 See In re Qimonda AG, 433 B.R. at 570 (concluding that “[d]eference to a foreign proceeding should not be 
afforded . . . where the procedural fairness of the foreign proceeding. . . cannot be cured” and “where taking such 
action would frustrate a U.S. court’s ability . . . and/or would impinge severely a U.S. constitutional or statutory 
right”). 
